ASLR机制脆弱性自动分析方法

地址随机化是一种针对控制流劫持漏洞的防御机制。已有的漏洞自动分析与利用技术缺少对地址随机化机制影响的分析,导致生成的测试用例在实际环境中的运行效果受到极大限制。针对地址随机化的缺陷及其绕过技术的特点,提出了一种地址随机化脆弱性分析方法。该方法使用有限状态机描述程序运行路径中各关键节点的状态;针对常见的内存泄漏与控制流劫持场景建立约束条件;通过求解内存泄漏状态约束与控制流劫持状态约束的兼容性,分析地址随机化机制在特定场景下的脆弱性。实验结果表明,该方法可有效检测通过内存泄漏导致的地址随机化绕过及控制流劫持攻击,实现自动化的地址随机化脆弱性分析,提高针对软件安全性分析的效率。     

H∞鲁棒滤波在机动目标跟踪中的应用

在交互多模型中通常使用的卡尔曼滤波器中，引入广义H∞鲁棒滤波器，以一定的精度为代价，换取满意的鲁棒性能。H∞鲁棒滤波算法可以分解为卡尔曼滤波和鲁棒化两个环节，从而形成一种基于增益失调因子的结构化分解算法。、为验证算法的有效性，进行了Monte Carlo仿真。仿真结果表明，本文算法跟踪复杂机动目标时跟踪性能有较大提高，有很好的可实现性.     

双机合作下的远程空空导弹攻击技术

探讨了双机合作条件下远程空空导弹的攻击技术.首先描述了双机合作下时间对准的方法和数据延时的处理,然后给出了空间对准的具体坐标转换公式,最后以基准制导坐标系为基础建立了无线电修正指令的矢量图,用矢量方程法推导了无线电修正指令的形成过程.     

美军临近空间平台的开发利用及对我军的启示

临近空间,通常是指20 km～100 km的高空,处于现有飞机的最高飞行高度和卫星的最低轨道高度之间.介绍了当前发达国家在临近空间军事应用领域的发展状况,尤其是美国在自由漂浮平台和临近空间机动飞行器的发展规划和正在进行的项目,分析了美军在临近空间平台发展通信、预警探测和侦察领域的具体情况.最后对我军临近空间开发利用提出一些思考.     

多管火箭武器储运发射箱长期储存蠕变性能预测

为探究火箭武器储运发射箱长期储存的蠕变性能,制备复合材料层压板并开展单轴拉伸蠕变试验,获得了单向纤维复合材料主方向的蠕变本构模型参数。采用有限元方法并借助用户自定义材料子程序建立储运发射箱长期储存蠕变的数值分析模型,预测了堆码储存15年后底层发射箱的蠕变变形。以储存后的发射箱作为初始状态建立弹管耦合发射动力学仿真计算模型,进一步分析蠕变对火箭弹发射过程的影响。仿真结果表明:蠕变引起的定向器平行度和发射箱底面平面度的变化均小于技术指标规定值,定向器束的最大残余变形在三维空间内呈马鞍状分布,上、下两行中间位置定向器的变形最大,左、右两列中间位置定向器的变形最小。定向器蠕变变形使得弹管间隙减小,火箭弹在管内运动使弹管之间的动态接触碰撞力增大,离轨速度降低。     

自反Banach空间一类完全广义集值强非线性混合似变分不等式问题

研究了一类完全广义集值强非线性混合似变分不等式在自反Banach空间下的问题，借助一个极大极小不等式，证明了这类完全广义集值强非线性混合似变分不等式的解的存在唯一性定理。     

环月轨道交会的奔月方案

研究了基于环月轨道共面交会的载人奔月方案.飞行方案设计采取人货分离的原则,包括3次发射,2次环月轨道交会.采用精确轨道动力学模型,得到了满足共面交会约束的发射窗口,以及地月转移轨道特性.进行了3次飞行任务的合理编排和规模估算,结果表明该方案在能量和时间需求上具备可行性.     

The Demand for Military Expenditure in Europe: The Role of Fiscal Space in the Context of a Resurgent Russia

A variant of established work on the demand for military expenditure is developed based on a practical concept of fiscal space from the perspective of short-term government choices concerning public expenditures. A new indicator, referred to as fiscal capacity, is defined and used as a candidate explanatory variable in an empirical model of European defence spending over the 2007–2016 period. Fiscal capacity is found to outperform simpler measurements of economic conditions, notably GDP growth forecasts, in explaining changes in defence spending efforts as a share of GDP. Regarding security environment variables, the results suggest that Russia has recently come to be seen as a potential military threat by European nations, leading to defence spending increases, the more so the shorter the distance to stationed or deployed Russian forces, and particularly so by those European nations that have a land border with Russia. A prospective exercise is then carried out in order to assess the capacity of EU member states that are also members of NATO to reach NATO’s 2% goal for defence spending over a mid-term horizon.     

美军“作战信息中心”的概念、内涵及启示

自20世纪中叶，美军舰载指挥控制系统中频繁出现一个词“CIC（ Combat Information Center）”，由此，CIC作为舰艇中枢神经，几乎成为美军各型舰艇的标准配置。国内很多技术人员和参考书籍将CIC翻译成“作战情报中心”，这容易引起很多误解。注意CIC用词“Information”，不是“Intelligence”，一词之差、谬之千里，应该译为“作战信息中心”。侧重于对CIC的内涵进行剖析，试图揭示其内在的发展规律。 CIC的演化过程中蕴涵着美军在装备发展过程中的各种试错、实践、经验和教训，美军装备建设的严谨、求实和科学的成份，特别是其技术进步的持续性和连贯性，值得借鉴和思考。     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.